No bullying! A playful proof of Brouwer's fixed-point theorem by Petri, Henrik & Voorneveld, Mark
ar
X
iv
:1
80
7.
10
90
6v
1 
 [m
ath
.G
N]
  2
8 J
ul 
20
18
No bullying!
A playful proof of Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem
Henrik Petri*1 andMark Voorneveld2
1Department of Economics, University of Bath, 3 East, Bath BA2 7AY, UK,
henrik@petri.se
2Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, 113 83
Stockholm, Sweden, mark.voorneveld@hhs.se
July 31, 2018
Abstract
We give an elementary proof of Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem. The only mathematical
prerequisite is a version of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem: a sequence in a compact subset
of n-dimensional Euclidean space has a convergent subsequence with a limit in that set. Our
main tool is a ‘no-bullying’ lemma for agents with preferences over indivisible goods. What
does this lemma claim? Consider a finite number of children, each with a single indivisible
good (a toy) and preferences over those toys. Let’s say that a group of children, possibly after
exchanging toys, could bully some poor kid if all group members find their own current toy
better than the toy of this victim. The no-bullying lemma asserts that some group S of children
can redistribute their toys among themselves in such a way that all members of S get their
favorite toy from S, but they cannot bully anyone.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to give a detailed, elementary proof of Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem
(Brouwer, 1911, Satz 4): in Euclidean spaceRn , a continuous function from and to the unit simplex
of nonnegative vectors with coordinates summing to one has a fixed point. The proof is accessi-
ble with a minimal mathematical background. Its main ingredient is a new ‘no-bullying’ lemma
(Lemma 2.1) in a simple economic setting, Shapley and Scarf’s (1974) classical housing market
model of agents with preferences over indivisible goods.
Park (1999) gives an historical overview of many ways to prove Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem;
rather than repeating them here, we get straight to work.
What is the prerequisite ‘minimal mathematical background’? The only result our proof takes
for granted is a version of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem: every sequence in a compact subset
of Rn , with its usual distance, has a convergent subsequence with a limit in this set.
And what is the no-bullying lemma? Consider a finite number of children, each with a single
indivisible good (a toy) and preferences over those toys. Let’s say that a group of children, possibly
after exchanging toys, could bully some poor kid if all group members find their own current toy
better than the toy of this victim. The no-bullying lemma asserts that some group S of children
can redistribute their toys among themselves in such a way that each member of S gets his or her
favorite toy from S and they cannot bully anyone.
The no-bullying lemma with children caring about toys seems rather remote from Brouwer’s
fixed-point theorem. But the link is easier to understand after seeing how certain combinatorial
proofs — often using variants of Sperner’s lemma (Sperner, 1928) — are structured; Scarf (1982,
sec. 3) and Border (1985, Ch. 3–6) contain pedagogical accounts:
A key first step is to find solutions to a system of inequalities relating the coordinates of vectors
to those of their function values. For instance, we will use that for each ε > 0 there is a set of
vectors in ∆ within distance ε from each other that contains, for each coordinate i , an element x
with xi −ε ≤ fi (x). The link is provided by introducing economic agents to whom it matters how
large these coordinates are: we introduce toys that correspond with vectors and children that care
about their coordinates — and we’re straight in the setting of the no-bullying lemma!
The second step is a standard limit argument: as ε tends to zero, the Bolzano-Weierstrass theo-
rem assures that those vectorsmay be chosen in such a way that they converge to a common limit
x∗. This limit x∗ is the desired fixed point. Since all x’s tend to x∗ and ε tends to zero, continuity
of f gives that x∗
i
≤ fi (x
∗) for all coordinates i . And the coordinates of x∗ and f (x∗) both sum to
one, so none of the inequalities can be strict: x∗ = f (x∗).
This gives us a clear road map for the remainder of our paper. We formulate the no-bullying
lemma in Section 2. We explain the intuition why the no-bullying lemma implies Brouwer’s fixed-
point theorem and then prove it formally. The proof of the no-bullying lemma itself is in Section 3.
The strategy will be to slightly relax the requirements in the lemma and — from a simple starting
point — make a series of small, explicitly defined changes until we arrive at a set of children and
a reallocation of their toys that satisfy all conditions of the no-bullying lemma. Section 4 contains
concluding remarks; most of these are technical and the section can be skipped by anyone just in-
terested in seeing how our proof works. The appendix discusses how other classical results in eco-
nomic theory, the lemmas of Knaster, Kuratowski, andMazurkiewicz (1929) and Sperner (1928),
follow from the no-bullying lemma.
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2 The no-bullying lemma and why it implies Brouwer
Consider a nonempty, finite set I of children, each with a single toy. For simplicity, each child has
strict preferences over toys and child i starts out with toy i . Formally, i ’s strict preferences are a
binary relation ≻i on I ; x ≻i y means that i strictly prefers toy x ∈ I to toy y ∈ I . These preferences
are assumed to be (a) total: for all distinct x, y ∈ I , x ≻i y or y ≻i x, (b) irreflexive: there is no x with
x ≻i x, and (c) transitive: if x ≻i y and y ≻i z, then also x ≻i z. Since no two toys are equivalent, i
has a well-defined most preferred element besti (Y ) in any nonempty subset Y of toys.
Say that a group of children could bully another child if its members agree that this victim has
a lousy toy: each group member finds his or her toy better than the victim’s toy. According to the
no-bullying lemma, some group Y of children can exchange their toys among themselves in such
a way that all members of Y receive their best toy from Y , yet they cannot bully anyone:
Lemma 2.1 (No-bullying lemma). Let I be a nonempty, finite set. For each i ∈ I , let ≻i be a strict
preference relation on I . Then there is a nonempty Y ⊆ I satisfying:
(a) Optimality: each i ∈ Y can get her most preferred element of Y , i.e., {besti (Y ) : i ∈ Y }= Y .
(b) No Bullying: there is no x ∈ I with besti (Y )≻i x for all i ∈ Y .
Observe that No Bullying implies Optimality: if there were an x ∈ Y \ {besti (Y ) : i ∈ Y }, then
besti (Y )≻i x for all i ∈ Y , contradicting No Bullying. But it is convenient to state both properties
explicitly: we often refer to Optimality in our proofs.
We prove the no-bullying lemma in the next section. It easily extends to distinct sets I of chil-
dren and T of toys, given some endowment ℓ : T → I mapping toys to their initial owner. The trick
is to identify both the set of children and the set of toys with {(i , t ) ∈ I ×T : i = ℓ(t )}. So toys are
labeled with their initial owners. And we replace child i with replicas, one for each toy she owns,
with the same preferences as i .
Corollary 2.2. Let each i in a nonempty, finite set I of children have strict preferences ≻i over a
nonempty, finite set T of toys. A function ℓ : T → I maps each toy t ∈ T to its initial owner ℓ(t ) ∈ I .
Then there are nonempty subsets C of children and E of toys they can exchange satisfying:
(a) Ownership: the members of C own the elements of E, i.e., C = {ℓ(t ) : t ∈ E }.
(b) Optimality: each i ∈C can get her most preferred element of E, i.e., {besti (E ) : i ∈C }= E.
(c) No Bullying: there is no t ∈ T with besti (E )≻i t for all i ∈C.
Proof. Let I∗ = {(ℓ(t ), t ) : t ∈ T }. For each (ℓ(t ), t ) ∈ I∗, define preferences ≻(ℓ(t ),t ) on I
∗ such that
(ℓ(t ), t ) inherits ℓ(t )’s preferences: (ℓ(t1), t1)≻(ℓ(t ),t ) (ℓ(t2), t2) ⇐⇒ t1 ≻ℓ(t ) t2. (1)
By Lemma 2.1, a nonempty Y ⊆ I∗ satisfies Optimality andNo Bullying. Let E = {t : (ℓ(t ), t ) ∈ Y } be
the exchanged toys and C = {ℓ(t ) : (ℓ(t ), t ) ∈ Y }= {ℓ(t ) : t ∈ E } their owners. By (1), the best toy of
(ℓ(t ), t )∈ Y from Y is the best toy of ℓ(t )∈C from E . So the Optimality and No Bullying properties
forC and E simply rephrase the corresponding properties of Y .
We use the no-bullying lemma to find approximations of fixed points:
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Lemma 2.3. Let f be a continuous function from and to∆= {x ∈Rn : x1, . . . ,xn ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 xi = 1}
in some n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn . For each ε> 0 there is a set T (ε)⊆∆ such that
for all x and y in T (ε): max
i
|xi − yi | < ε, (2)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} there is an x in T (ε)with xi −ε≤ fi (x). (3)
Before we give the intuition behind Lemma 2.3 and prove it, we show that f has a fixed point
via a standard limit argument. Let ε1,ε2, . . . be a sequence of positive numbers converging to zero.
For each such εm > 0, take a set T (εm) as in the lemma and an element x(m) ∈ T (εm). These
x(1),x(2), . . . lie in the compact set ∆. By the Bolzano-Weierstrass theoremwemay pass to a subse-
quence if necessary and assume that they converge to a limit x∗ ∈∆. By (2), the distance between
the elements of T (εm) tends to zero as εm → 0. So all sequences obtained by assigning to each
integer m an element of T (εm) converge to x
∗. Taking limits, (3) and continuity of f then give
that x∗
i
≤ fi (x
∗) for each i . Since the coordinates of x∗ and f (x∗) both sum to one, these weak
inequalities must be equalities: x∗ = f (x∗), proving Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem.
But it looks like a huge step from the no-bullying lemma to Lemma 2.3. What is the intuition?
Fix a large, finite subset of ∆ by giving coordinates only finitely many values. This grid is our set
of toys. Introduce one child for each coordinate i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Child i prefers points with small i -th
coordinates. Now apply Corollary 2.2. With suitable initial endowments, the set of exchanged toys
satisfies the conditions on approximate fixed points in Lemma 2.3. Roughly speaking, if the no-
bullying lemma gives each child i in subset C a toy, Optimality and i liking small i -th coordinates
imply that its i -th coordinate can’t be very large. But such coordinates can’t be very small either:
then it were possible to define a vector where all coordinates i ∈C are a bit larger. So all members
of C find this vector strictly worse, contradicting No Bullying. This doesn’t leave much room to
manoeuver in: the exchanged toys lie near each other, as (2) says.
The proof sketch hasn’t mentioned function f yet, let alone why (3) holds. The initial endow-
ment provides this link. Each toy changing hands is owned by some child inC . The endowment is
chosen such that if i ∈C owns x, then xi ≤ fi (x). This clearly implies the inequality xi −ε ≤ fi (x)
in (3). And if i lies outside C , the left side of (3) turns out to be nonpositive for all exchanged toys,
but its right side is nonnegative: function values lie in ∆. Now the formal proof:
Proof of Lemma 2.3. Let ε> 0. Let positive integer N satisfy 2n/N < ε. Apply Corollary 2.2 to toys
T = {x ∈∆ : xi ∈ {0/N ,1/N , . . . ,N/N } for all i = 1, . . . ,n},
elements of ∆ whose coordinates are multiples of 1/N , and children I = {1, . . . ,n}, one per coor-
dinate. For each i ∈ I , let ≻i be any strict preference on T where i prefers smaller i -th coor-
dinates: for all x, y ∈ T , if xi < yi , then x ≻i y . Such preferences are not unique: i may order
vectors with identical i -th coordinates arbitrarily.1 If x ∈ T , there is an i with xi ≤ fi (x), since
the coordinates of x and f (x) both sum to 1. Define endowments ℓ : T → I for each x ∈ T by
ℓ(x)=min{i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} : xi ≤ fi (x)}.
By Corollary 2.2, there are subsets C of I and E of T satisfying Ownership, Optimality, and No
Bullying. We show that Lemma 2.3 holds if we take T (ε) := E , the set of exchanged toys.
1E.g., i may have lexicographic preferences and look at the coordinates in some fixed order, starting with coordinate
i . Let x ≻i y if x j 6= y j for some coordinate j and, in the fixed order of the coordinates, the first such j has x j < y j .
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For i ∈C , let β(i ) :=besti (E ) be i ’s favorite toy in E . We first prove 3 observations: (O1) for each
x ∈ E and i ∈C , βi (i )≤ xi ; (O2)
∑
i∈C βi (i )> 1−
n
N
, and (O3) for each x ∈ E and i ∉C , 0≤ xi <
n
N
.
(O1) holds because i ∈ C finds β(i ) better than all other elements of E and i likes small i -th
coordinates. For (O2): if, to the contrary,
∑
i∈C βi (i )≤ 1−
n
N , then 0≤
∑
i∈C
(
βi (i )+
1
N
)
≤ 1. So there
is an x ∈ T with xi = βi (i )+
1
N if i ∈C . Then βi (i )< xi , so β(i )≻i x for all i ∈C , contradicting No
Bullying. (O3) follows from (O1) and (O2): if x ∈ E and i ∉C , then
0≤ xi ≤
∑
m∉C
xm = 1−
∑
m∈C
xm
(O1)
≤ 1−
∑
m∈C
βm(m)
(O2)
<
n
N
.
Now (2) holds: Let x, y ∈ E and i ∈ I . We show that |xi − yi | < ε. If i ∈C , then
0
(O1)
≤ xi −βi (i )≤
∑
m∈C
(
xm −βm(m)
)
≤ 1−
∑
m∈C
βm(m)
(O2)
<
n
N
<
ε
2
,
and similarly for y . By the triangle inequality, |xi − yi | ≤ |xi −βi (i )|+ |βi (i )− yi | < ε. If i ∉C , then
the triangle inequality and (O3) give |xi − yi | ≤ |xi |+ |yi | < 2n/N < ε.
Also (3) holds: Let i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. If i ∈C , then by Ownership, there is an x ∈ E with ℓ(x) = i , so
xi −ε< xi ≤ fi (x). If i ∉C , then for each x ∈ E , xi ≤n/N < ε by (O3). So xi −ε< 0≤ fi (x).
Some remarks about the top-trading cycle algorithm: We formulated the no-bullying lemma in
familiar economic vocabulary: agentswith preferences over indivisible goods, as in Shapley and Scarf
(1974). Their article is famous for introducing the top-trading-cycle (TTC) algorithm for socially
stable allocations of indivisible goods, so the question naturally arises whether the resulting allo-
cations have anything in common.
On the positive side, Optimality says that owners within a subset S redistribute their toys so
that each member receives her most preferred one: if you restrict attention to the subproblem
reduced to agents and their toys in S, the whole market clears already in the very first iteration
of the TTC algorithm with everybody obtaining their favorite item. But you cannot simply ignore
the agents outside S and this makes the connection with the TTC algorithm only superficial: in
the following example, no member of the only set S satisfying the conditions of the no-bullying
lemma gets the same item as in the TTC algorithm.
Example 2.1. Consider three children with preferences over their toys as follows:
2≻1 1≻1 3, 3≻2 2≻2 1, 2≻3 1≻3 3.
In the first iteration of the TTC algorithm, 2 and 3 exchange toys. In the second iteration, 1 is stuck
with toy 1. But neither S = {2,3} nor S = {1} satisfies No Bullying: 2 and 3 can bully 1, since
best2({2,3})= 3≻2 1 and best3({2,3})= 2≻3 1.
Likewise, 1 can bully 3, since best1({1})= 1≻1 3. Checking the remaining candidates, it follows that
only S = {3} — child 3 holding on to toy 3— satisfies the conditions of the no-bullying lemma. But
in the TTC algorithm, child 3 was allocated toy 2 instead of toy 3. ⊳
Intuitively, if you get an item in an iteration of the TTC algorithm, then it is the remaining item
you likemost. Whether you are a potential target for bullying is about something different, namely
whether others find your item worse than their allotment. They have little to do with each other.
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The no-bullying lemma does not aim for efficiency: Optimality requires owners within a subset S
to redistribute their toys optimally, but No Bullying pushes in the opposite direction: members of
S shouldn’t get toys that are too good, because then it is easier to find a target for bullying. So the
lemma is not a normative principle of distributive justice. It is just a useful tool in our proofs, cast
in a language that hopefully makes it easier to remember.
3 Proof of the no-bullying lemma
Fix a nonempty finite set I of children/toys and strict preferences ≻i over I for each child i ∈ I . A
pair (Y ,Z ) of nonempty subsets Y (children) and Z (toys) of I that satisfies
Optimality (Opt ): {besti (Z ) : i ∈ Y }= Z , (4)
No Bullying (NoBull ): there is no x ∈ I with besti (Z )≻i x for all i ∈ Y , (5)
and Y = Z proves the no-bullying lemma 2.1: just plug Y = Z into (4) and (5). To ease the search,
allow pairs where Y and Z are almost the same— the number of elements |Y \Z | of Y \Z is small:
Almost (Almost ): |Y \Z | ≤ 1.
Pair (Y ,Z ) is a candidate if it satisfies Almost and NoBull. Just as in Lemma 2.1, each candidate
satisfiesOpt : if there were an x ∈ Z \{besti (Z ) : i ∈ Y }, then besti (Z )≻i x for all i ∈ Y , contradicting
(5). We find a candidate with Y = Z by startingwith a simple candidate andmaking a series of one-
element adjustments.
A neighbor of candidate (Y ,Z ) is a candidate obtained by adding or removing a single element
in exactly one of the sets Y or Z . Formally, the symmetric difference of sets A and B is A△B =
(A \B )∪ (B \A). Candidates (Y ,Z ) and (Y ′,Z ′) are left neighbors if |Y △Y ′| = 1 and Z = Z ′; they are
right neighbors if Y =Y ′ and |Z△Z ′| = 1; they are neighbors if they are left or right neighbors.
We often usemonotonicity: if (Y ,Z ) satisfies Almost, then so do (Y ′,Z ) for any smaller Y ′ ⊆ Y
and (Y ,Z ′) for any larger Z ′ ⊇ Z . And if (Y ,Z ) satisfies NoBull, then so do (Y ′,Z ) for any larger
Y ′ ⊇ Y and (Y ,Z ′) for any smaller ; 6= Z ′ ⊆ Z . Only the last point is nontrivial, but if members of
Y can’t bully using the best elements in the large set Z , they surely can’t with those in subset Z ′.
Lemmas 3.1 to 3.3 characterize the neighbors of candidates (Y ,Z ) with Y 6= Z . Opt gives
|Y | ≥ |{besti (Z ) : i ∈ Y }| = |Z |. So by Almost, Y has |Z | or |Z | + 1 elements. Lemma 3.1 treats
the candidates with |Y | = |Z | = 1 and Lemma 3.2 those with |Y | = |Z | ≥ 2; in the latter case, Y 6= Z
and Almost imply that Y \ Z and Z \Y are singletons. In particular, Z \Y = {k} for some k ∈ I .
Finally, Lemma 3.3 addresses candidates with |Y | = |Z |+1; by Almost, Z is then a proper subset of
Y . And since Y has one element more than {besti (Z ) : i ∈ Y }= Z , there is a unique pair j1 and j2
of distinct elements in Y with the same best element of Z : best j1(Z )= best j2(Z ).
For i ∈ I , let wi be i ’s worst element of I : x ≻i wi for all x 6=wi . Let Bi = ({i }, {wi }).
Lemma 3.1. For each i ∈ I , Bi is the unique candidate whose first component is {i }. If i 6= wi , then
its unique neighbor is ({i ,wi }, {wi }).
Proof. Bi is a candidate: clearly, Almost holds; NoBull holds by definition of wi . If also ({i },Z ) is a
candidate, Z is a singleton byOpt. And byNoBull, this singleton must be {wi }.
Suppose that i 6=wi . Bi has no right neighbor as it is the only candidate with first component
{i }. If (Y , {wi }) is a left neighbor, then Y cannot be empty. To satisfy Almost, the only element we
can add to {i } is wi . By monotonicity, this ({i ,wi }, {wi }) also satisfiesNoBull.
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Lemma 3.2. If candidate (Y ,Z ) has |Y | = |Z | ≥ 2 and Z \Y = {k} for some k ∈ I , then (Y ,Z \{k}) and
(Y ∪ {k},Z ) are its only neighbors.
Proof. If (Y ,Z ′) is a right neighbor, then Z ′ = Z \{k}: since |Y | = |Z |, adding an element to Z would
contradict Opt. And to satisfy Almost, the only element we can remove is k . By monotonicity,
(Y ,Z \ {k}) satisfiesNoBull.
Likewise, if (Y ′,Z ) is a left neighbor, then Y ′ = Y ∪ {k}: since |Y | = |Z |, removing an element
from Y would contradict Opt. And to satisfy Almost, the only element we can add is k . By mono-
tonicity, (Y ∪ {k},Z ) satisfiesNoBull.
Lemma 3.3. If candidate (Y ,Z )has |Y | = |Z |+1, let j1 and j2 be the unique pair of distinct elements
of Y with best j1(Z )=best j2(Z ). For j ∈ { j1, j2}, let the possible bullying victims of Y \ { j } be
V j := {x ∈ I : besti (Z )≻i x for all i ∈ Y \ { j }}.
If V j =;, then (Y \ { j },Z ) is a neighbor. If V j 6= ; and x j is its≻ j -worst element, then (Y ,Z ∪ {x j }) is
a neighbor. This describes two neighbors, one for each j ∈ { j1, j2}. There are no others.
Proof. If (Y ′,Z ) is a left neighbor, then Y ′ =Y \{ j } for some j ∈ { j1, j2}: removing any other element
of Y would violateOpt and adding an element to Y would violate Almost. This (Y \{ j },Z ) satisfies
Almost by monotonicity. It satisfiesNoBull if and only if V j =;.
We prove: (Y ,Z ′) is a right neighbor if and only if Z ′ = Z ∪ {x j } for some j ∈ { j1, j2} with V j 6= ;.
A right neighbor (Y ,Z ′) adds an element, say t , to Z : removing one violates Almost. Now
|Y | = |Z ′|, so by Opt each element of Z ′ is most preferred in Z ′ by a single i ∈ Y . As j1 and j2 no
longer have the same favorite, one j ∈ { j1, j2} has the added t as the most preferred element and
all other i ∈ Y \ { j } still prefer an element of Z to t . So t ∈V j . By NoBull of (Y ,Z ∪ {t }), there is no
x with besti (Z ∪ {t })= besti (Z )≻i x for all i ∈ Y \ { j } and best j (Z ∪ {t })= t ≻ j x, i.e., no x ∈V j with
t ≻ j x. So t ∈V j is j ’s worst element x j of V j .
It remains to show that (Y ,Z ∪ {x j }) is a candidate for all j ∈ { j1, j2} with V j 6= ;. Almost holds
by monotonicity. Does NoBull hold? Since x j ∈ V j , each i ∈ Y \ { j } has besti (Z ∪ {x j }) = besti (Z ).
Then best j (Z ∪ {x j }) = x j : otherwise besti (Z ) ≻i x j for all i ∈ Y , contradicting NoBull of (Y ,Z ).
If (Y ,Z ∪ {x j }) violates NoBull, there is an x ∈ I with besti (Z ∪ {x j }) = besti (Z ) ≻i x for all i ∈ Y \
{ j } and best j (Z ∪ {x j }) = x j ≻ j x. So x ∈ V j and x j ≻ j x. But x j is j ’s worst member of V j , a
contradiction.
If V j 6= ; for both j ∈ { j1, j2}, the members of Y \ { j } can bully x j . But then x j1 6= x j2 : otherwise
(Y ,Z ) violatesNoBull. In particular, Lemma 3.3 always produces exactly two neighbors.
We finally show that there is a candidate (Y ,Z ) with Y = Z . Fix i ∈ I . Look at candidate
({i }, {wi }) in Lemma 3.1. If i =wi , we’re done. If not, move to its only neighbor ({i ,wi }, {wi }). Now
proceed recursively: as long as we’re at a candidate (Y ,Z ) with |Y | ≥ 2 and Y 6= Z , Lemma 3.2 or
3.3 assures that (Y ,Z ) has exactly two neighbors. So we canmove to a neighbor other than the one
we just came from. Suppose this path of neighboring candidates does not reach a candidate (Y ,Z )
with Y = Z . As the set of candidates is finite, only two things can happen: (1) the path cycles, re-
visiting a candidate we encountered before; or (2) we come to a candidate without two neighbors,
i.e., a candidate (Y ,Z ) where Y is a singleton. But both lead to a contradiction:
If it cycles, pick the first candidate (Y ,Z ) to be revisited. Can it have |Y | ≥ 2? It can only be
reached via one of its two neighbors. But that neighbor was passed on the first visit as well, either
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going to (Y ,Z ) or coming from (Y ,Z ). So (Y ,Z ) is not the first to be revisited. Likewise, it can’t have
|Y | = 1, which can only be arrived at via its unique neighbor. So cycling gives a contradiction.
If we reach a candidate with singleton first component, it is of the form ({ j }, {w j }) for some
j ∈ I by Lemma 3.1. We assumed j 6=w j . Reviewing the statements of Lemma 3.1 to 3.3, note that
if candidate (Y ,Z ) with Y 6= Z has neighbor (Y ′,Z ′), then Y ′\Z ′ ⊆ Y \Z . So each candidate (Y ′,Z ′)
on the path from ({i }, {wi }) has Y
′ \ Z ′ ⊆ {i }. Since { j } \ {w j } = { j }, it follows that j = i : the path
returns to ({i }, {wi }). A contradiction, since we ruled out cycles.
4 Concluding remarks
General: The goal of this paper was to give a very elementary proof of Brouwer’s fixed-point theo-
rem: if you knowBolzano-Weierstrass, you’re good to go! The proof follows the strategy of standard
combinatorial proofs (see Scarf’s (1982) overview) to find vectors satisfying a system of inequali-
ties and then apply a limit argument. But in contrast with such proofs, our no-bullying lemma that
helps to produce the inequalities requires no knowledge about simplicial subdivisions or triangu-
lations, the facial structure of polytopes, and the dimension and boundaries of such faces relative
to suitably chosen affine hulls. With the no-bullying lemma, it is possible to prove the fixed-point
theorem rigorously at an early stage of the undergraduate curriculum.
We purposely framed the lemma as a playful story about children and toys that hopefully
makes it easier to remember.
Proof variants: It might seem inefficient to provide two versions of the no-bullying lemma.
But proving the simpler version (Lemma 2.1) and deriving the second as a corollary (Corollary 2.2)
requires substantially less cumbersome notation. Similarly, appropriately rephrased versions of
the no-bullying lemma hold if we allow weak instead of strict preferences, but our simpler case
already produces the results we need.
To prove existence of approximate fixed points in Lemma 2.3, we applied the no-bullying
lemma to a sufficiently fine grid of points in the simplex. For simplicity, we gave each coordinate
finitely many feasible values 0, 1/N , . . . , N/N , for some large integer N . But there is considerable
freedom. A sufficient condition for a grid T to contain such an approximate fixed point is that for
each z ∈ Rn+ with
∑
j z j ≤ 1−ε/2 there is a t ∈ T with z j < t j for all j . Indeed, from property (O2)
in Lemma 2.3, we want a particular inequality:
∑
i∈C βi (i )> 1−ε/2. The sufficient condition on T
assures this, but looks less appetizing than providing a natural grid explicitly.
Topics of ongoing work: A useful consequence of the freedom to choose a grid is that if one
grid works, then so does any finer grid. To fine-tune algorithms searching for better approxima-
tions of a fixed point, this option to add grid points wherever we please can be an advantage over
traditional simplicial algorithms where points in the grid typically need to satisfy additional topo-
logical/affine independence/nondegeneracy assumptions. So even though the points in our grid
happen to be the vertices of a simplicial subdivision (Kuhn, 1968, p. 1240), this is of no relevance
to our proof.
We leave it to subsequent work to address such algorithmic aspects in detail. We do briefly
mention two results. Firstly, we proved the no-bullying lemma using a path-following algorithm.
This algorithm can be shown to belong to a complexity class PPAD (Polynomial Parity Argument
for Directed graphs) introduced in Papadimitriou (1994). Problems in that complexity class are
typically geometric, searching for a point in a Euclidean space satisfying certain conditions. In
that sense, the no-bullying problem is a distinctive member of the PPAD class, coming from a
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purely combinatorial setting of agents with preferences over finitely many alternatives.
Secondly, Scarf’s algorithmfinds approximate fixedpoints in so-calledprimitive sets; Tuy (1979)
generalizes this approach in a more abstract setting and finds ‘completely labeled primitive sets’
with properties similar to those satisfying the conditions of the no-bullying lemma with distinct
sets of children and toys.2 His path-following algorithm and ours are similar in the sense of obtain-
ing the desired sets using a series of small changes, but distinct in other senses.3
A Appendix: The KKM Lemma
Also another classical result in economic theory, the eponymous KKM lemma of Knaster et al.
(1929), follows directly from the no-bullying lemma. Their proof used Sperner’s lemma; Border
(1985, Sec. 9) gives two proofs using Brouwer. As before, fix n ∈ N and ∆ = {x ∈ Rn : x1, . . . ,xn ≥
0 and
∑n
i=1 xi = 1}. For each nonempty J ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}, let ∆J = {x ∈∆ : x j = 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,n} \ J }.
Theorem A.1 (KKM Lemma). If X1, . . . ,Xn are closed subsets of ∆ such that ∆J ⊆
⋃
j∈J X j for each
nonempty J ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}, then
⋂n
i=1 Xi 6= ;.
Proof. It suffices to show that for each ε > 0 there is a set S(ε) ⊆ ∆ with (i) an element in each
Xi and (ii) for all x, y ∈ S(ε), maxi |xi − yi | < ε. Indeed, let positive ε1,ε2, . . . tend to zero and let
S(ε1),S(ε2), . . . be such corresponding sets. By (i), for each εm > 0 and coordinate i , there is an
xi ,m ∈ S(εm)∩ Xi . Sequence (x1,m)m lies in compact set ∆. By Bolzano-Weierstrass, we may pass
to a subsequence if necessary and assume it converges to some x∗ ∈ ∆. It also lies in X1, which is
closed. So x∗ ∈ X1. By (ii), the distance between the elements of S(εm) goes to zero as εm → 0. So
for each coordinate i : xi ,m→ x
∗ and x∗ ∈ Xi . Hence, x
∗ ∈
⋂n
i=1 Xi .
So let ε> 0. Let positive integer N have 2n/N < ε. Apply Corollary 2.2 to I = {1, . . . ,n} and
T = {x ∈∆ : xi ∈ {0/N ,1/N , . . . ,N/N } for all i = 1, . . . ,n}.
For each i ∈ I , let strict preferences ≻i be such that x ≻i y whenever xi > yi : i prefers larger i -th
coordinates. For x ∈ T , let Jx = { j ∈ I : x j > 0}. Then x ∈ ∆Jx ⊆ ∪ j∈Jx X j , so there is a j with x j > 0
and x ∈ X j . Define ℓ : T → I by letting ℓ(x) be any such j . By Corollary 2.2, a pair of subsets C of I
and E of T satisfy Ownership, Optimality, and No Bullying. We show that S(ε) := E satisfies (i) and
(ii).
(i): Each i ∈ C gets her best toy β(i ) := besti (E ) in E : βi (i ) ≥ xi for all x ∈ E . If βi (i ) = 0 for
some i ∈C , then xi = 0 and hence ℓ(x) 6= i for each x ∈ E , contradicting Ownership. So βi (i ) > 0
for all i ∈ C . If k ∈ I \C , each i ∈ C then prefers β(i ) to the k-th standard basis vector ek of R
n ,
contradicting No Bullying. So I equals C = {ℓ(x) : x ∈ E }: for each i ∈ I , some x ∈ E has ℓ(x) = i .
Hence x ∈ Xi .
(ii): For each i ∈ I , βi (i ) > 0 and β(i ) ∈ T imply βi (i ) ≥
1
N . Also,
∑
i∈I βi (i ) < 1+
n
N : otherwise,∑
i∈I
(
βi (i )−
1
N
)
≥ 1, so there is an x ∈ T with 0≤ xi ≤βi (i )−
1
N for all i . Then xi <βi (i ), so β(i )≻i x
2More precisely: in the notation of Corollary 2.2, he also considers a finite collection (≻i )i∈I of preferences over a
set T , but needs to extend those preferences to T ∪ I . If one reverts the preferences on T —he characterizes his sets in
terms of least preferred elements, whereas we are interested in most preferred ones — then a pair (C ,E) satisfying the
conditions of our Corollary 2.2 correspondswith a completely labeled primitive setU := E∪(I \C )⊂ T ∪ I in Tuy (1979).
3For instance, primitive sets always have the same number of elements, whereas the size |Y |+|Z | of candidates (Y ,Z )
in our proof may change. Moreover, primitive sets do not refer to ownership/labels, whereas candidates — through
Almost —do. The latter helps to keep the graph relatively small.
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for all i ∈ I , contradicting No Bullying. For all i , j ∈ I , Optimality implies βi (i )≥βi ( j ), so
0≤βi (i )−βi ( j )≤
∑
k∈I
(
βk(k)−βk( j )
)
=
∑
k∈I
βk (k)−1<
n
N
.
Finally, let x, y ∈ E and i ∈ I . By Optimality, there are j ,k ∈ I with x =β( j ) and y =β(k), so
|xi − yi | = |βi ( j )−βi (k)| ≤ |βi ( j )−βi (i )|+ |βi (i )−βi (k)| <
2n
N
< ε.
Sperner’s lemmacanbeprovedby applying theKKM lemma toparticular sets Xi ; see Voorneveld
(2017). So with minor changes the proof above can be rewritten to derive Sperner’s lemma from
the no-bullying lemma.
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